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RESEARCH on Imperial Russia’s contacts and connections with Eastern Or-
thodox communities in the Levant in the early nineteenth century aroused my 
interest in how Britain, that other edge of Europe, related to the Ottoman 
Empire during this tumultuous period.  Traders, travelers, envoys, consuls, 
and others registered their impressions and observations in myriad writings, 
providing historians with a treasure trove for probing the Eastern Question, 
the nineteenth-century European dilemma of what to do with the surprisingly 
resilient Ottoman Empire, still possessing strategic lands and vital waterways in 
the Near East.  Russian and British archival and printed sources widen our  
perspective on the history of the Eastern Question, transforming what many 
scholars have portrayed as a largely one-dimensional military, naval, and dip-
lomatic subject into a multi-faceted and more animated picture, with strategic 
objectives intertwined with commercial, religious, and cultural endeavors.1  
Manuscripts and archives, from Russian and British collections, reveal vivid 
stories on religion, trade, piracy, rebellion, and intrigue, allowing us to recon-
struct the various interactions between the peoples who lived, traveled, traded, 
and served in the Ottoman Levant.2 
 My recently published book, based on Foreign Office documents at 
the National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom, presents largely untapped Brit-
ish consular records on the state of the Ottoman Empire in the early nine-
teenth century, an epoch fraught with internal and external pressures triggered 
by war, revolt, secessionist agitation, the breakdown of effective governing in-
stitutions, and European intervention.3  British consuls, stationed in Preveza, 
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Constantinople, Smyrna, Cairo, Alexandria, and Aleppo, compiled countless 
reports on a range of subjects.  Their writings chronicled ongoing challenges 
from rebels, pashas, and pirates; conveyed images and scenes of sectarian hos-
tility; detailed the intricacies of consular and commercial transactions; and 
documented the insecurity and uncertainty of Ottoman-European treaty con-
tracts in an age of upheaval.  By relating specific incidents and episodes, these 
eyewitness communiqués offer insight into the dynamics of European rivalry, 
intrigue, and influence in the Ottoman Empire during a time of profound 
change and chronic unrest.  Rich in texture, detail, and nuance, these snapshot 
accounts underscore the problems that comprised the Eastern Question and 
resonate with contemporary relevance, describing commercial competition, 
religious conflict, smuggling, regional warlords, plundered antiquities, outside 
interference, and the ambiguity of borders in the Ottoman East. 
 My current research focuses on the copious unpublished correspon-
dence of Lord Strangford, Britain’s ambassador at the Sublime Porte during 
the turbulent years from 1821 to 1824.4  Based on the information he received 
from British consuls in the Levant and the intelligence he gleaned from 
European diplomats and Ottoman foreign affairs officials in Constantinople, 
Strangford reported regularly to the Foreign Office in London.  His writings, 
enough to fill a projected four-volume collection of his dispatches, extensively 
covered the major consequences of the Greek revolt, in particular the religious 
nature of the Greek-Ottoman clash, the threat of hostilities between Russia and 
Turkey, the challenge to British commercial and strategic interests in the 
Levant, the destruction of the island of Chios, and the mediation of European 
envoys like himself to thwart a wider conflagration in the Near East.5  For the 
talk this evening, in keeping with the spirit of the James W. Cunningham 
Memorial Lecture series on Eastern Orthodox history and culture, passages 
from Strangford’s letters to Foreign Secretary Castlereagh during the first, and 
arguably the most critical, year of the Eastern crisis that exploded in 1821 
highlight the British envoy’s perception of the embattled condition of Eastern 
Orthodoxy in the sultan’s realm. 
 The Greek Revolution, erupting in the Danubian Principalities in 
March 1821 and extending to the Morea, Attica, Thessaly, Macedonia, and the 
Aegean Archipelago, spawned an Eastern cataclysm with European-wide re-
percussions.6  The established order of legitimacy confronted the principles of 
liberty and nationality.  The revolt morphed into the prolonged Greek War of 
Independence, a struggle that drained Ottoman resources and revenues, pro-
duced an independent Greek kingdom, and inspired revolutionary outbreaks 
in Europe, Russia, and the Balkans.  Already in the first few months of the in-
surgence, European envoys at the Porte had to cope with the messy and seem-
ingly intractable realities of the Eastern emergency: the rise of sectarian strife, 
the upsurge in piracy, the disruption of trade, and the risk of war between 
Russia and Turkey, especially after the Russian legation severed official ties 
with the Porte and left Constantinople in the summer of 1821. 
 The religious and nationalistic fervor of the Greek-Ottoman collision 
became readily evident as each side perpetrated excesses that escalated the feud 
into a war of retribution.  The prominent Balkan historian Leften Stavrianos 
has argued effectively that large-scale massacres against the defenseless repre-
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sented “an inevitable accompaniment, perhaps, of a struggle that pitted, at one 
and the same time, Greek subjects against Turkish overlords, Greek peasants 
against Turkish landowners, and Greek Christians against Turkish Moslems.”7  
In the volatile spring and summer of 1821, random attacks occurred against 
Greek churches, shops, and reaya,8 in Constantinople, Smyrna, Salonica, 
Crete, and Cyprus, often in retaliation for Greek aggression against Turks in 
the Morea and Moldavia and for Greek confiscation of Turkish properties.  
These assaults not only intensified denominational animosity but transformed 
the revolt into a conflict driven by the quest for sacred revenge, a struggle in 
which national identity heightened religious division.9  Mutual atrocity and 
reprisal eroded a tradition of tolerance, coexistence, and interaction that had 
long characterized relationships between the empire’s various sectarian groups 
at the grassroots level of society.  A mosaic of pluralistic but segmented confes-
sional communities, with separate identities but shared experiences, began to 
fracture after living together in relative peace and harmony.10  The religiously 
tinged nationalism unleashed by the War of Independence gave rise to sim-
mering discontent in a heterogeneous Ottoman dominion. 
 The insurrection incited indiscriminate mob violence and janissary 
rage against Greek residents of Constantinople, as described in the eyewitness 
testimony of Reverend Robert Walsh, chaplain at the British embassy.11  Vic-
tims included Greeks of rank and influence suspected of complicity in the re-
volt, but the most notorious reprisal struck the leadership of the Eastern Or-
thodox Church.  Despite the encyclical of Ecumenical Patriarch Grigorios V 
denouncing the rebellion and exhorting Orthodox Christians to remain loyal to 
the sultan, the Porte considered him guilty of treason because he had failed to 
fulfill his basic duty as head of the Eastern Orthodox community, namely, to 
ensure that his flock obeyed and submitted to Ottoman rule.  The patriarch’s 
public execution, on Easter Sunday in April 1821, together with the persecu-
tion of numerous bishops and clergy, provoked widespread attacks against 
Greek churches and property in Constantinople, prompted outrage and re-
proach from European envoys at the Porte, and ignited Russian Orthodox 
sympathy and support for Greek coreligionists.  Moreover, the defiled corpse 
of the patriarch—left hanging in public for three days, dragged through the 
streets of the capital, and tossed into the Golden Horn—symbolized Ottoman 
suppression of Eastern Orthodox Christians and turned the Greek rising into a 
sanctified national crusade.12 
 The turmoil in Smyrna, the most prosperous and vibrant Ottoman 
commercial port at the time, demonstrated the unraveling of Ottoman imperial 
authority and the collapse of public order during the initial stage of the East-
ern convulsion.  Descriptions by Russia’s consul-general, Spyridon Destunis, 
and by Britain’s consul, Francis Werry, painted an alarming picture of the 
breakdown of effective local government in the face of urban unrest, sectarian 
discord, social confusion, and trade dislocation.13  Life in Smyrna seemed pre-
carious, having to endure random violence by Turks and Greeks, retribution 
by unruly janissaries, closed stores and shops, and Greek flight to the harbor 
and adjacent islands.  The anguish and anxiety felt by those residents adversely 
affected by the disarray exemplified the potential for social and political anger 
that lurked just beneath the surface of Ottoman society, especially when the 
42 Theophilus C. Prousis  
central government faced critical internal and external pressures.  The troubles 
in Smyrna underscored the need for governmental and administrative reform, 
an institutional restructuring that would restore stability, protect private prop-
erty, maintain public security, and guarantee personal safety.  Food shortage, 
trade disruption, and mob aggression reinforced religious tension and drove 
many Greeks and European consular staff to seek haven on European ships 
anchored in the Smyrna harbor.  With telling detail, Destunis and Werry cap-
tured the commotion and hostility that typified the denominational strife in 
this bustling emporium. 
 Maritime fallout added fuel to the fire.  The Greek revolt exacerbated 
the peril of piracy in the eastern Mediterranean, all the more so as the Greek 
rebel fleet routinely raided Ottoman and European maritime transport.  In-
deed, the Aegean Archipelago, according to a prominent scholar of Ottoman 
Smyrna and the Levant trade, “became almost impassable,” as Greek privateers 
targeted Ottoman, European, and even American commercial ships.14  Not 
just piracy but also Ottoman-imposed restrictions hampered the trade of 
European powers, in particular Russia and Britain, in the Black Sea.  Ottoman 
officials inspected Russian-flagged merchant vessels that traversed the Straits, 
primarily as a precaution against arms and supply shipments to insurgents 
from Russia’s Greek communities in Odessa and elsewhere along the northern 
shores of the Black Sea.  When Greek defections from the Ottoman merchant 
marine, as well as Greek piracy, endangered food deliveries to Constantinople 
and the Ottoman army, the Porte closed the Sea of Marmara to grain traffic 
and made Russian vessels sell their goods to Ottoman state warehouses.  Rus-
sia’s Black Sea grain exchange plummeted, shipping and insurance rates 
soared, and several Odessa firms lost revenues.  These commercial conse-
quences of war and rebellion in the Near East jeopardized the continued eco-
nomic growth not just of Odessa but of the entire region of southern Russia. 
 Trade in Ottoman waters became risky business for Britain as well.  
British-flagged carriers, moving grain and other cargoes from Black Sea ports, 
faced scrutiny and pressure when passing the Straits.  The Porte ordered the 
confiscation of some of these transports in order to provision the capital and 
the army, while others had to sell their merchandise at prices at or below mar-
ket value, thereby undercutting expected Levant Company profits.  Ottoman 
customs authorities also detained British vessels, sometimes for thirty to forty 
days.  British diplomatic and Levant Company officials, echoing Russian pro-
tests, complained to the Porte by invoking the Treaty of the Dardanelles 
(1809) and other agreements that stipulated unobstructed commercial passage.  
To British and Russian objections, the Porte asserted the prerogative to pre-
empt grain and other foodstuff cargoes deemed indispensable by the govern-
ment in wartime, regardless of the trade concessions granted to European 
states.  As a result, Ambassador Strangford, together with John Cartwright, 
British consul-general in Constantinople, approved the stratagem of fictitious 
manifests, a tactic to evade Ottoman impediments by devising ship declarations 
that did not accurately identify the merchandise in transit, its place of origin, 
or its destination.  Even with fabricated manifests, British exports and imports 
dropped in value, in marked contrast to the upsurge in Levant Company ex-
change before 1821, particularly with Smyrna.15 
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 The heart of the Eastern crisis in 1821, notwithstanding the serious-
ness of sectarian frenzy and commercial dislocation, remained the threat of 
war involving the great powers, in particular Russia, which had to balance its 
national interests in the Near East with its adherence to the Concert of 
Europe.  Strategic, trade, and religious pursuits in the turbulent Levant did not 
mesh well with the preservation of the political status quo in Europe, and fric-
tion between these competing considerations underscored the complexity of 
the Eastern Question for Russia.  Already before the Greek uprising, disputes 
over Russian claims in the Caucasus and the Danubian Principalities strained 
Russian-Ottoman ties, and the insurrection only magnified the discord.16 
 In taking measures to crush the Greek mutiny, the Porte infringed 
upon specific articles in Russian-Ottoman treaties and thus antagonized official 
relations between the two empires.  Reprisals against the Greeks breached the 
Porte’s promise in the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774) to shelter the faith 
and churches of Ottoman Christians.17  Trade obstacles seemingly contravened 
Russia’s right of unimpeded merchant navigation in the Straits, guaranteed by 
Kutchuk-Kainardji and the Treaty of Commerce (1783).  The Porte’s dismis-
sal of the hospodars (governors) of Moldavia and Wallachia, accusing them of 
abetting the revolt, undermined the sultan’s imperial decree of 1802, and 
subsequent stipulations in the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), sanctioning Russian 
consent in the appointment and deposition of hospodars.  Facing strong public 
clamor for intervention on behalf of persecuted Greeks, and despite urgent 
calls by high-ranking officials for military action to rectify broken treaties, 
Alexander I upheld the order of legitimacy.  The tsar denounced the rebellion 
as a menace to Europe’s peace and security and to the principles of monar-
chical solidarity and political stability; he also advocated the Porte’s swift 
suppression of the disorders before they engulfed other regions.  At the same 
time, the tsarist regime demanded the strict observance of Russian-Ottoman 
treaties, intent on using them as instruments for exerting pressure on Turkey. 
 The Foreign Ministry’s dual approach of censuring the revolt but in-
sisting on complete compliance with treaty accords became the basis for 
Russian policy in 1821.  Russia’s ambassador in Constantinople, Grigorii A. 
Stroganov, rebuked the insurrection but remonstrated for Orthodox brethren, 
protested violations of trade clauses, and counseled moderation and restraint 
in Ottoman treatment of non-insurgent Greek reaya.18  The Porte, however, 
suspected Russian complicity in the upheaval for a host of reasons: Russia’s 
past wars against Turkey; its self-proclaimed guardianship of Orthodox 
Christians under Ottoman rule; its generous support of Greek migration to 
southern Russia, in particular the distribution of land grants and tax exemp-
tions to Greek settlements in recently annexed Ottoman territories; and its ex-
tensive network of Greek protégés in Black Sea and Aegean commerce. 
Furthermore, Greek merchants in Odessa participated in the national ferment 
that produced the Philiki Etaireia (Society of Friends), the secret society that 
launched the insurgence of 1821.  Founded in Odessa (1814) and head-
quartered in Kishinev, this conspiratorial organization recruited members and 
monies from Greek centers in Russia and came under the leadership of 
Alexander Ypsilanti, a Greek general in the Russian army and an aide-de-camp 
of the tsar.19  Russian-Ottoman treaty provisos crumbled not just because of 
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the Porte’s plausible, but mistaken, accusations of the Russian government’s 
entanglement in the sedition but because of the outbreak of denominational 
violence in Constantinople, Smyrna, and elsewhere.  Ironically, treaties that 
sought to maintain cordial ties between Russia and Turkey and to safeguard 
Russian activities in the Near East did neither. 
 In an ultimatum delivered to the Porte on 6/18 July 1821, Russia de-
manded the evacuation of Ottoman troops from the Danubian Principalities, 
the restoration of damaged churches and religious properties, the protection of 
Orthodox Christians, and the guarantee of commercial rights.  If the sultan did 
not accept these terms, Russia would have to offer asylum and assistance to all 
Christians subjected to “blind fanaticism.”20  The Porte’s failure to comply 
within the prescribed eight-day deadline, followed by Ambassador Stroganov’s 
departure from the Ottoman capital, severed official relations between Russia 
and Turkey, the two realms most profoundly affected by the uproar of 1821.  
Thus began a strange twilight period of no war yet no peace.  Alexander I 
proved reluctant to act unilaterally without the sanction of the Concert of 
Europe and dreaded the prospect of a Russian-Turkish clash that would dis-
rupt the status quo, incite revolts elsewhere, and jeopardize the balance of 
power in Europe.  Firmly committed to the Concert of Europe, the tsar sus-
pected that a Jacobin directing committee in Paris had instigated trouble in the 
Balkans.  Yet the Eastern quagmire thickened, Ottoman-Greek fighting intensi-
fied, Russian-Ottoman affairs festered, and treaty vows shattered amid war and 
revolution in the Levant. 
 Britain faced its own dilemma over the Eastern Question quandary, an 
“unsolved problem, pregnant with vital and incalculable consequences.”21  
Foreign Secretary Castlereagh sympathized with the Greek cause on moral and 
humanitarian grounds but regarded the Greeks as rebels against the established 
political order, a status quo that he associated with the Concert of Europe and 
its defense of geopolitical security in Europe.  His mixed reaction reflected the 
competing currents of philhellenic enthusiasm and non-interventionist senti-
ment that prevailed in numerous sectors of British government and society.  
Britain remained neutral in the Greek-Ottoman feud yet pursued its own stra-
tegic, political, and commercial ends.  Castlereagh resolved to avert a wider 
war between Russia and Turkey, maintain the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark 
against the perceived peril of Russian expansion, protect and increase British 
trade in the Levant, and secure the land and sea routes to India.22  After 
Stroganov’s departure from Constantinople, Castlereagh instructed Lord 
Strangford to defuse Ottoman-Russian tensions and to resolve the Greek dis-
pute in his dealings with the Porte.  In cooperation with other European dip-
lomats, Britain’s ambassador pressed the Porte to comply with the major 
points in Russia’s ultimatum, in particular to halt persecutions of Greek 
Christians, repair damaged churches, honor treaty pacts, and guard the life 
and property of “innocent” non-combatants, in contrast to “guilty” rebels who 
deserved punishment. 
 Despite his considerable skill and finesse in trying to offset the exigency 
of 1821, Strangford remains a controversial figure.  As the chief representative 
of British policy in the Near East, he magnified tsarist ambitions in the region, 
fueled Ottoman suspicion of Russian aims, and chided Stroganov for his harsh 
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tone in dealing with the Porte.  Yet he worked tirelessly with European and 
Ottoman counterparts to neutralize a dangerous situation and protect Ortho-
dox Christians, convinced that the Porte’s restoration of order, safekeeping of 
sacred shrines, and evacuation of troops from the Danubian Principalities 
would forestall Russian-Turkish hostilities.23  Through patient and persistent 
negotiation, Britain’s ambassador and his colleagues prevented war, sought to 
pacify the Greek insurgency, and eventually restored direct talks between Rus-
sia and Turkey.  Strangford’s view of the Eastern crisis—only one view to be 
sure—reminds us of the wealth of primary sources that await scrutiny by histo-
rians of the Eastern Questions.  His prolific letters from the Ottoman capital, 
addressed to Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, related indelible images of sectar-
ian strife, scenes that evoked the religious wrath and nationalistic ferocity 
which prolonged, as well as epitomized, the Greek-Ottoman fight. 
 From the onset of the Ypsilanti-led uprising in the Danubian Princi-
palities, and amid growing evidence of Russian complicity in the disturbance, 
Strangford immediately anticipated friction between Russia and Turkey.  Even 
though “[t]he endeavours of the Russian minister [Stroganov] to acquit his 
government in the opinion of the Porte of any participation in the revolt of 
Wallachia and Moldavia are indefatigable and do the highest credit to his zeal 
and address,” the sedition tended “in the strongest manner to confirm the sus-
picions imbibed by the Porte of the sincerity of his assurances.”  For instance, 
at a general meeting of Russian subjects and Greeks under Russian protection, 
Stroganov urged 
 
the persons present to sign an act expressive of their adherence to the [tsarist] 
emperor under all circumstances, and in every event.  This proceeding at such a 
moment is considered by the Porte as little short of an insult.  The other circum-
stance . . . is the discovery that a Russian ship bound for Galatz in Moldavia, and 
furnished with the Russian minister’s pass, had concealed in her hold a large 
quantity of cannon and military stores.24 
 
Even tsarist Russia’s formal denunciation of the Ypsilanti revolt did not as-
suage the Porte’s inkling of Russian involvement, especially since “the Russian 
government admits too unreservedly the right of the Greeks to pretend to an 
amendment of their political state.”  Besides, 
 
the disavowal by Russia of [the Greeks’] present proceedings appears to 
originate rather in a sense of the inconvenience of the season which they have 
chosen for them, than in a decided disapprobation of the object to which they are 
directed.25 
 
 Together with his foreboding of a Russian-Turkish confrontation, 
Strangford registered concern over the impending threat of anti-Greek repri-
sals.  Already in late March 1821, he wrote, 
 
It seems that there prevails at Constantinople (in consequence of the late rebel-
lious proceedings in the provinces, and of the proclamations of the insurgent 
chiefs), a general belief that the Greek reaya, throughout the whole extent of the 
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Ottoman Empire, are on the point of rising against the authority of the sultan.  
This notion is said to pervade a large part of the population [of the Ottoman 
capital]. 
 
In retaliation against this allegedly widespread insurgency, according to infor-
mation Strangford gleaned from the Porte, a design took shape, “formed by 
some persons who have influence over the populace, to attack the houses of 
the wealthy Greek inhabitants of the Phanar, to plunder them, and to massacre 
their owners.”  Besides posting extra guards, the Porte restored arms to those 
janissary units previously “in confinement for offences against discipline” and 
ordered them “to join their respective divisions.”  Partly because of “the vigor-
ous and prudent precautions of the government,” the night of the rumored 
outburst “passed without alarm.”26 
 Yet the religious dimension of the Greek-Ottoman struggle, above all 
Ottoman attacks against Greek Christian property and churches, became all 
too palpable to Strangford.  On 10 April 1821, he reported that the Ottoman 
government 
 
perseveres in its endeavours to strike terror into the minds of its Greek sub-
jects; and it seems that these efforts have been very successful.  The commerce of 
the Greeks has been altogether suspended—their houses have been shut up—
and an armed and licentious population, wandering through the streets of this 
capital and its suburbs, daily commit such excesses as destroy all confidence on 
the part of the reaya in the security of their lives and property. 
 
This state of affairs, Strangford asserted, 
 
has been principally excited by the official declarations emanating from the gov-
ernment, in which the insurrections in Wallachia and Moldavia, and the rebel-
lious movements in other places, are attributed to a design formed by the 
Greeks, for the total overthrow of the Mahometan religion.  These declarations 
speak at once to the passions and prejudices of the people, and it is not surprising 
that they should have produced in the minds of Turks the highest degree of fury 
and exasperation. 
 
Understandably, Strangford and Britain’s consul-general in Constantinople, 
John Cartwright, described cases of “insults and robberies having been lately 
committed on the persons of some of His Majesty’s subjects,” including mem-
bers of the British Levant Company, who “communicated to me, through the 
consul-general, the anxiety and alarm which they felt in consequence of the 
disturbed state of this capital.”27 
 Violent incidents heightened the mood of disquiet and apprehension 
in Constantinople, especially at European embassies.  The unexpected “dis-
grace and execution of Prince Constantine Mourousi, dragoman [interpreter or 
translator] of the Porte,” suspected of supporting or at least sympathizing with 
Ypsilanti’s uprising, temporarily interrupted the relations of European lega-
tions with the Ottoman government.  When the Porte sent nearly five thousand 
troops up the Black Sea, to disembark at Varna, their departure 
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was, as usual, the signal for every sort of disorder and violence, and the banks of 
the Bosporus were for some days the scene of the most disgraceful atrocities.  
Some of the troops landed in various places, and pillaged several houses, among 
which were some belonging to or under the protection of foreign missions. 
 
During their passage through the channel, they “fired into several ships” and 
killed two Austrian sailors.  Although the Porte expressed regret over such 
abuses, 
 
In truth, the little attention which is paid to the complaints of the foreign minis-
ters here, when they are compelled to represent the violence and insults which 
are offered to themselves, their families, and the subjects of their respective 
courts, renders, at the present moment, the discharge of their public duties a 
matter of no ordinary difficulty and, to a certain degree, of personal danger to 
those who are in their employment.28 
 
 The fate of Mourousi had an immediate and significant repercussion 
on Ottoman diplomacy with Europe, as Strangford readily surmised in his 
communiqué of 25 April 1821. 
 
A person named Yanco Stavrak Oglu has been appointed to succeed the late 
dragoman of the Porte.  Formerly the selection for this office was made among 
the Greeks of the Phanar.  The present dragoman has no connection with them, 
and is little known at the capital.  The cause of Prince Mourousi’s disgrace and 
execution is now ascertained.  He received a letter from Prince Ypsilanti, invit-
ing him to participate in his projects. 
 
Although Mourousi instantly delivered a translation of this epistle to the Porte, 
the sultan demanded to see the original missive and requested another trans-
lation, “to be made by another person.”  This second translation “differed from 
the first, inasmuch as Prince Mourousi had omitted or softened a paragraph in 
the original” that tended to compromise tsarist Russia.  “The indignation of the 
sultan was immediately and violently excited, and the results were fatal to 
Prince Mourousi.”  Russia’s envoy, Stroganov, attempted to convince 
Strangford that the paragraph in question actually dealt with another matter 
and that “it implied the existence of a previous correspondence between Prince 
Ypsilanti and the dragoman of the Porte” (emphasis original).  But the British 
ambassador had “reason to believe that the other interpretation . . . attributed 
to this paragraph is much nearer the truth.”29 
 The Ottoman government later announced to European envoys “its in-
tention of recalling all its public agents, being Greeks, now residing at foreign 
courts, and of hereafter employing in that character none but Mussulman 
subjects of the Porte.”  The decision to replace Ottoman Greek diplomatic 
representatives with Muslim officials partly stemmed from the conduct of 
Theodore Negri, a Phanariote recently appointed Ottoman chargé d’affaires at 
Paris. 
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He proceeded some weeks ago, ostensibly on his mission, as far as Tinos, and on 
his arrival at that island, left his ship, and hastened to join the insurgents in the 
Morea, declaring that he had never meant to go to Paris, and that he had accepted 
the appointment only to have an excuse for getting away in safety from Constan-
tinople.30 
 
 No other event did more to underscore and amplify the widely per-
ceived sacred character of the Greek-Ottoman fray than the 1821 execution of 
Ecumenical Patriarch Grigorios V, the official head of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church.  For Strangford, the outrage “too clearly proves the determination of 
the Porte to keep no measures with its unfortunate Greek subjects.”  In 
straightforward language, the British ambassador explained what happened: 
 
At five o’clock on the evening of Easter Sunday [April 1821], the good and vener-
able patriarch, after performing the service of that solemn festival, was seized on 
his departure from the church, and hanged at the gate, in the presence of an im-
mense multitude.  Three more Greek bishops (those of Ephesus, Derkon, and 
Aghialos) were executed at the same time, and in the same ignominious manner, 
but in different quarters of Constantinople.  They had been some time in con-
finement. . . . The patriarch was in the eighty-second year of his age, and of the 
most exemplary character and conduct.  It is said that his offence was his having 
aided the family of Prince Demetrius Mourousi (brother to the lately executed 
dragoman of the Porte) to escape from this country. 
 
Strangford elaborated on the rise of denominational extremism in the after-
math of this tragic event. 
 
These atrocious and sanguinary proceedings, and the peculiarly shocking circum-
stances under which they have taken place, have excited the utmost consternation 
among all classes not professing the Mahometan faith.  They plainly indicate that 
the councils of this Empire are now directed by a spirit of relentless fanaticism 
from which the most dreadful results may be expected [emphasis original].31 
 
 Troubling news from Francis Werry, Britain’s consul in the maritime 
center of Smyrna, only increased the fear and fright in Constantinople.  Werry 
informed Strangford “of the alarming and successful progress of the revolted 
Greeks in the Morea” and of the Greek rebel navy’s “system of piratical depre-
dation, from which our commerce will have to apprehend the worst conse-
quences.”32  Werry also anticipated the terrible fallout from the patriarch’s fate: 
 
The certainty of the execution of the Greek patriarch has impressed the Greeks 
of all descriptions with the greatest horror, and will lead I fear to the most un-
happy consequences.  A patriarch I trust has been immediately named, who will 
have great influence over the minds of the fanatics, who are capable of the most 
desperate attempts.33 
 
 Strangford’s subsequent dispatches of May 1821 portrayed an escalat-
ing Eastern flashpoint, fueled largely by the danger of partisan slaughter.  Re-
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cent Ottoman imperial edicts evinced “views . . . of a very alarming nature,” 
clearly proving “the disposition of the Porte to give to the present unhappy 
state of things in this country the character of a conflict between the Christian 
and Mahometan religions” and directly appealing “to the fanaticism of the 
people.”  Threat morphed into reality, as 
 
Public executions among the Greeks are still of daily occurrence.  Five of their 
churches have been plundered and destroyed by the janissaries, and there is but 
too much reason to apprehend that these excesses were not committed without 
the permission of the government. 
 
In nearby Adrianople, “the ex-patriarch of the Greek Church shared the fate of 
the Patriarch Gregory, and was hanged at the window of his metropolitan 
residence,” while 
 
twenty-three rich and respectable Greek merchants were beheaded; not in vir-
tue of orders from Constantinople, but because such was the pleasure of the 
janissaries.  The mullah [chief Islamic judge] vainly attempted to stop the barba-
rous proceeding, and his own life was exposed to the utmost danger in the course 
of his humane exertions to save the unfortunate victims.34 
 
In the Morea, based on the accounts Strangford read, 
 
A small body of troops under the command of Yussuf Pasha (and not exceeding 
eight hundred men) has completely routed a corps of six thousand Greeks. . . . 
The latter took to flight, with all the alacrity of modern patriots. . . . The slaughter 
of the Greeks both before and after the battle (if it may be so termed) was prodi-
gious, and several baskets of ears and tongues have been exhibited at the Porte.35 
 
 Impediments to shipping and navigation further destabilized Eastern 
affairs.  The Porte took steps to prevent the maritime escape of Greek subjects, 
requiring the inspection of all foreign vessels departing from Constantinople 
and the placement of an Ottoman officer on ships destined for the Black Sea.  
But these precautions, as Strangford discovered from his dragoman’s discus-
sion with the reis efendi, or Ottoman foreign minister, targeted Russian-flagged 
carriers in particular. 
 
[T]hese measures were to be a mere form, as far as English vessels were con-
cerned, . . . they had been made applicable to ships of all nations, solely that they 
might not appear to be (as was really the case) exclusively directed against those 
of Russia. 
 
Traitorous subjects of the Porte “being almost daily permitted to escape, under 
the Russian flag, . . . were openly received at Odessa and in other parts of the 
Russian dominions,” while “Baron Stroganoff, by his hauteur and violence, 
seemed determined to brave the Porte.”  The Ottomans simply sought to end 
“this state of things, so offensive to the rights and dignity of a great and power-
ful sovereign.”  Yet the sultan’s government, “desirous to avoid everything that 
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might have an unfriendly appearance towards Russia, had prudently resolved 
to make the present measures general for all nations, and not particular to-
wards the Russian navigation” (emphasis original).  While these safeguards 
“were to be nothing more than a matter of form with respect to others, they 
would be exerted with the utmost rigour towards the vessels of a power which 
had so constantly and so openly abused the privilege of its flag.”  The pro-
posed restraints 
 
had been communicated to the Russian dragoman, with an intimation that if any 
inconvenience should arise from them, it would be chargeable to M. de 
Stroganoff, whose conduct, alone, had rendered them necessary. . . . [T]he Porte 
would never endure the humiliation of suffering a foreign minister to lay down 
the law within her dominions, and . . . Baron Stroganoff must be taught that the 
Sultan Mahmood [Mahmud II] was as much the independent sovereign of a 
powerful Empire as the Emperor Alexander [I].36 
 
 The increasingly religious dimension of the conflict, in conjunction 
with Ottoman restrictions on Russian shipping in the Straits and Ottoman mili-
tary actions in the Danubian Principalities, prompted harsh tsarist complaints.  
Strangford’s dispatches chronicled the mounting acrimony between Russia and 
Turkey, in particular over the plight of Eastern Orthodoxy in the Ottoman 
realm.  In early May 1821, Stroganov staunchly pressed the Porte about its 
seemingly systematic oppression of the Greek faith, lodging a strongly worded 
protest against 
 
[t]he alarming character of the proceedings adopted by the Porte towards its 
reaya, in their quality of members of the Greek religion—the destruction of 
several Greek churches—and the public execution of the ministers of that faith, 
both at Constantinople and elsewhere. 
 
The Russian envoy, Strangford alleged, 
 
made the strongest and most energetic representations, grounding them princi-
pally on the VII and XIV Articles of the Treaty of 1774 . . . , which treaty certainly 
does give the Russian minister a distinct right to interfere in questions affecting 
the security of the Greek ecclesiastical establishment in this country. 
 
But Stroganov “was so little satisfied with the explanations which he received 
on this matter that on the following day, he renewed his complaints in the 
form of an official note to the Porte.”37 
 In early June 1821, Stroganov presented another spirited grievance to 
the Porte, “conceived in language of no ordinary vehemence.”  This objection 
boldly affirmed the intention of the tsar “to grant an asylum to every Christian, 
flying from Turkish oppression, who shall seek it within his dominions.”  
Stroganov then proceeded “to assume as a fact that the present contest is one 
of religion, and that this government is resolved ‘de frapper de mort et 
d’extermination tout ce qui porte le nom de Chrétien en Turquie’” [to strike 
dead and exterminate anyone who bears a Christian name in Turkey].  The 
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Russian envoy concluded by announcing that the tsar had commanded him to 
leave Constantinople, “accompanied by his legation, and by all the Russian 
subjects remaining here, as soon as he should judge that the state of matters 
imposed that necessity upon him.”  Strangford swiftly perceived the gravity of 
the tone and language of his Russian counterpart’s declarations, “above all, the 
unqualified manner in which the Porte is accused of being actuated by a spirit 
of sanguinary persecution, joined to the unexpected resolution proclaimed by 
the emperor, of permitting the rebels to take refuge in his states.”  These 
developments, Strangford predicted, “will have an effect very opposite to that 
of re-establishing [the Porte’s] relations with M. de Stroganoff on a footing of 
amity and confidence.”38 
 In an extended encounter with the reis efendi, Strangford attempted to 
mollify the widening dispute between Russia and Turkey.  First and foremost, 
regarding the fate of the patriarch, Britain’s envoy conveyed his apprehension 
that the circumstances of the church leader’s death sentence “might occasion 
the Porte to be accused, in foreign courts, of a disposition unfriendly to the 
Christian religion.”  The reis efendi 
 
repelled this idea with considerable energy, and said that the fact of the execu-
tion having taken place on Easter Sunday was an accident, and not by any means a 
designed insult to that solemn festival—that the question of the patriarch’s guilt 
had only been determined on the preceding day—but that the nature of his pun-
ishment had not then been decided on. 
 
In the interval, noted the Ottoman foreign minister, “a fresh mass of the most 
convincing evidence against him had been submitted to the sultan, who, in a 
fit of violent anger and indignation, had ordered his instant execution.”  While 
the Greeks 
 
who had massacred the Turks at Galatz had indeed chosen Friday for the com-
mission of that atrocious act, . . . it would have been utterly beneath the dignity of 
the Sublime Porte to have imitated them in such an unworthy mode of insulting 
religion [emphasis original]. 
 
Additionally, the reis efendi continued, 
 
the present contest was not of a religious character, [since] the Porte had never 
been biassed by any consideration of the faith of the individuals whom she was 
occasionally called upon either to condemn or to spare—citing, in proof of the 
first of these assertions, the recent execution of several Mussulmans, and 
amongst them, one of a very distinguished rank among the teachers of that relig-
ion—and in support of the second, the prompt and ready attention shewn by the 
Porte to my demands in behalf of the Christians at Smyrna and elsewhere, and, 
more recently, in favor of the inhabitants of Milos.39 
 
 When the subject turned to other sources of Russian-Ottoman tension, 
the reis efendi enumerated “the causes of complaint against” Stroganov and 
“the multiplied proofs of forbearance and moderation, which (he insisted) had 
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been shewn by the Porte.”  Significantly, he assured Strangford “that [the Ot-
toman government’s] quarrel with the Russian envoy was purely personal, and 
that they drew a distinction between his conduct, and the views and disposi-
tions of his court” (emphasis original).  The Ottoman foreign minister then 
depicted a sorry state of affairs in the sultan’s realm, a predicament that neces-
sitated a purely defensive posture vis-à-vis Russia: “‘Is it to be supposed,’” 
asked the reis efendi, 
 
“that we should be so utterly destitute of common sense as to seek a rupture with 
Russia, at a moment when the latter has a vast disposable army on our very fron-
tier—when we are harrassed with rebellions and insurrections in every part of 
our dominions—when our means of equipping the fleet are so limited and so 
precarious that we had the utmost difficulty in preparing a small squadron to de-
fend our navigation in the Archipelago—and when, in addition to these circum-
stances, we have the conviction that there is not a power in Europe (fatigued and 
exhausted as they all are by a long war), even among those who are the most 
friendly to us, who would fire a single shot on our behalf?”40 
 
 These “frank admissions” gave Strangford “an opportunity of urging 
(without fear of offending the Ottoman pride) the absolute necessity of mod-
eration and temper, and the expediency of even making some slight sacrifices, 
in order to conciliate the Russian minister.”  The upshot of the reis efendi’s 
reply convinced Strangford 
 
that the Porte will do everything to avoid a rupture with Russia, that she will 
leave no effort untried to rid herself of the presence of the Russian envoy—
whose activity she terms importunity, and whose firmness is construed into 
insolent and offensive obstinacy—[and] that a direct appeal to the Emperor 
Alexander [I] will sooner or later be resorted to by the Porte, and will probably 
be accompanied by a representation to some other courts. 
 
The British ambassador also concluded 
 
that matters are still capable of being arranged in an amicable manner, provided, 
on the one hand, that the sultan does not yield to the natural violence and impa-
tience of his temper and on the other, that the next instructions from the em-
peror to his minister . . . be not such as to render future negotiation hopeless or 
impracticable.41 
 
 In his report of 23 July 1821, with Russian-Ottoman official relations 
still at an impasse over an array of issues, Strangford extensively covered the 
tsarist ultimatum recently delivered to the Porte, a diplomatic note that threat-
ened to trigger an imminent clash between Russia and Turkey.  Ottoman offi-
cials not only expressed shock and surprise at the ultimatum’s “tone of arro-
gance” but did not believe their government could meet Russia’s request of an 
eight-day deadline.  The reis efendi stated that 
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however disposed the government might be to reply in an amicable manner, it 
would be physically impossible not only to have the answer ready within the term 
so peremptorily prescribed, but to go through the various forms which are indis-
pensable to the progress of public business.42 
 
Even without official delays, and even if the cumbersome process of Ottoman 
decision-making quickened, Strangford did not think Ottoman measures 
would satisfy Stroganov, especially since the Russian envoy declared “that he 
must have facts, not protestations” (emphasis original). 
 Religious matters comprised the essence of the Russian ultimatum.  
Strangford contended that the Porte would be “disposed to reject with haugh-
tiness and indignation the assertion put forward by Russia,” namely, that 
 
the co-existence of Turkey with the other states of Europe has hitherto been en-
dured solely under the tacit convention that she should treat her Christian sub-
jects with indulgence—that Russia was to be the judge of the degree and quality 
of that indulgence [emphasis original]. 
 
If Turkey’s mistreatment of the Greeks dissatisfied the tsarist government, then 
Russia falsely assumed the right, “on proclaiming her dissatisfaction, to array 
against the Turkish Empire the united force of all Christendom, and to declare 
its existence to be incompatible with the stability and security of the Christian 
faith.”  The British ambassador sharply avowed his “unfeigned concern at the 
exaggerated statements which have gone abroad, and which have been copied 
into all the public journals in Europe respecting the conduct of the Porte to-
wards its insurgent subjects.”  The scope of these declarations, Strangford 
maintained, “is to shew that Turkey is resolved, not to subjugate the Greeks as 
rebels, but to exterminate them as Christians—and thus to give to the present 
contest, the character of a war of religion.” 
 Strangford vigorously disputed these religious accusations, widespread 
in Russia and the rest of Europe. 
 
The Greek subjects of the Porte are everywhere in rebellion against their sov-
ereign.  These rebels are Christians—and the punishment . . . inflicted upon 
them is imposed in the former, and not in the latter of these characters.  There 
have, elsewhere, been instances of revolts conducted by subjects of a different 
faith from that generally established in the country; but it was never thought that 
in endeavouring to suppress rebellion, it was the intention of the lawful govern-
ment to wage a war of proscription against the religion of the rebels. 
 
As for outrages committed against Greek shrines in Constantinople, Strangford 
modified his previous indictment of the Ottoman government.  He now as-
cribed blame to “a furious and fanatic multitude.  They were publicly dis-
avowed by the government, who has, since, taken every measure likely to pre-
vent the recurrence of such disgraceful excesses.”  Moreover, 
 
It is a fact that since the first moment of general popular indignation, occasioned 
by the discovery of the Greek conspiracy, not one of the churches belonging to 
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that religion has been destroyed or injured—that the Greeks do upon all occa-
sions resort to them as freely as heretofore—that the new patriarch has received 
a firman [an Ottoman imperial decree], permitting him to rebuild or repair 
those which had suffered from the fury of the janissaries; and that out of a num-
ber of seventy-six churches and chapels, in the city and neighbourhood of Con-
stantinople, [only one was utterly destroyed and thirteen plundered] or other-
wise injured by the mob. 
 
To emphasize this last point, Strangford attached a statement “communicated 
to me by a Greek priest of high respectability—who certainly will not be sus-
pected of being inclined to palliate the conduct of the Turks.”43 
 The central theme of Russia’s religious narrative, the death of the ecu-
menical patriarch, justifiably drew Strangford’s attention in his rejoinder to the 
tsarist ultimatum.  He deplored in the strongest terms the severity and condi-
tions of the patriarch’s execution but attempted to explain the punishment. 
 
I feel myself bound in conscience and in honour to declare my positive convic-
tion, founded on grounds of evidence which cannot be suspected, that not only 
that unfortunate prelate, but many, if not all the bishops who shared his fate, were 
deeply involved in a conspiracy, of which the Greek clergy were the principal 
agents and promoters. 
 
In sentencing these individuals to death, the Porte did not act out of enmity to 
their religion, as evinced “in the fact that every one of the sees thus rendered 
vacant was instantly filled up, and with a scrupulous regard to the rites and 
usages of the Greek Church.” 
 Based on “these impressions, and with the knowledge of these facts,” 
Strangford adamantly refuted the validity of those points in the Russian note 
that “represent the Porte to be actuated by a spirit of sanguinary persecution.”  
These allegations confounded “the past excesses of the populace with the pre-
sent sentiments and intentions of the government” and gave “no credit to the 
latter for that better order of things which its exertions have at length pro-
duced.”  Furthermore, Strangford rejected the Russian proclamation that just 
 
because the rebel Greeks profess the same faith as Russia, the punishment of 
their treason is to be considered as a signal of hostility against Christendom in 
general, and as giving to all the powers of Europe the right to make common 
cause for the annihilation of the Turkish Empire. 
 
 The British ambassador, however, did not think “that the Porte could 
or would refuse to accede to the greater part” of Russia’s requests. 
 
The rebuilding of the demolished chapels has already been permitted to the pa-
triarch, and the principle once recognized, it does not seem very difficult for the 
government to carry it a little further, and to consent to reconstruct or repair 
those edifices at its own expence. 
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As for the security of the Greek faith, “its rites are regularly performed, and 
numerously attended by the Greek population of this capital and its environs.”  
A satisfactory Ottoman response to tsarist censure of the patriarch’s death 
“might be given, by a full and fair disclosure of the evidence on which he was 
condemned.”  Lastly, the Russian demand that the Porte should differentiate 
between guilty Greek rebels and innocent Greek non-combatants did not pose 
an obstacle.  The assurance that the sultan’s government 
 
will take every precaution, to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, is an act of 
such positive justice, and is moreover so strictly in conformity to the various fir-
mans and hatti-sherifs [Ottoman imperial edicts] lately issued by the Porte, that I 
cannot imagine that a mere feeling of resentment, for the imperious manner in 
which this requisition is made, ought to prevent the Turkish ministers from ad-
mitting it. 
 
 Strangford unequivocally accepted Russia’s claim to interfere in the 
affairs of the Danubian Principalities.  Despite “an actual and humiliating sac-
rifice of the rights of sovereignty on the part of the sultan,” the stipulations of 
treaties “are so powerfully in favour of Russia that the Porte can have no just 
plea for resisting her demands for their fulfillment.”  In concluding his lengthy 
commentary on the ultimatum, Strangford hypothesized that “in making these 
representations in a manner so little calculated to conciliate the haughty spirit 
of the Ottoman government,” Russia probably intended not to defuse the cur-
rent crisis but to precipitate a war, the results of which “cannot be doubtful.”  
Ostensibly caused by Russia’s imperative of safeguarding the Greek Church, 
this anticipated fight would seek to uphold “that influence which she has so 
long been labouring to create in Greece.”  In pronouncing itself the protector 
of Orthodoxy, Russia 
 
confidently hopes to place herself, by the events of the war, in such a position as 
will enable her to extend over the whole Greek nation that authority and that 
protection which treaties (the result of similar wars) have given her a right to ex-
ercise in Wallachia and Moldavia.44 
 
 Two days later (25 July 1821), convinced of the probability of war, 
Strangford solicited Foreign Secretary Castlereagh on behalf of unprotected 
British subjects and their property in Constantinople.  The Porte, the envoy 
feared, would prove unable to cope 
 
with the overwhelming means which Russia is able to direct against her.  To 
remedy this deficiency, it can hardly be doubted that the Ottoman government 
will make a direct and most powerful appeal to the fanaticism, and to all the evil 
passions of the Turkish population. 
 
The military struggle would then assume 
 
on the side of Turkey the character which Russia has already proclaimed as be-
longing to it—namely, that of a war of religion.  The undistinguishing operation 
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of this principle, on the inflamed and excited minds of the whole Turkish nation, 
will undoubtedly lead to the most dangerous results, and the Christian inhabi-
tants of this capital will [most] probably be exposed to a common and indiscrimi-
nate persecution. 
 
Dreading the consequences of this aggression, “when they shall have been 
publickly called forth by the government itself, and when the dictates of fury 
and fanaticism shall be quickened by a sentiment of national despair,” Strang-
ford requested ships of war in the Dardanelles, “for the protection of His Maj-
esty’s subjects and their property in this city.”  While affirming his intent to stay 
at his post, “under all circumstances, however alarming,” he graciously 
pleaded for “means to be provided for the security of my family.”45 
 The standoff appeared all the more intractable when official relations 
between Russia and Turkey ended on 30 July 1821.  When the Porte did not 
give Stroganov a written reply to the Russian claims within the prescribed 
eight-day period, the tsarist legation left Constantinople, thus severing diplo-
matic negotiations between the two countries most affected by the Eastern 
mess.  Although the Ottoman government professed its readiness to meet the 
terms of the ultimatum, the Russian ambassador had not received a formal 
response by the expiration of the deadline.  In an extended account to 
Castlereagh, Strangford summarized the reis efendi’s statement of alleged as-
sent.  The Porte, according to the British envoy, “solemnly and explicitly dis-
avowed the intention of persecuting the Greeks on account of their religion or 
of waging a war of extermination against them as Christians.”  The patriarch 
“had been punished for his treasons only, and not as chief of a religion dif-
ferent from that of the state,” and “the indignities offered to his corpse were the 
consequence of the wild and ungovernable fanaticism of the multitude, and 
not that of the orders of government.”  With the restoration of order and quiet, 
“permission would be given to repair the churches and chapels which had 
suffered from the fury of the mob.”  In addition, the Porte had always en-
deavored, even in the current predicament, 
 
to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, lamenting that any case should ever 
have occurred, without its knowledge or consent, in which they had been con-
founded—a circumstance which was not the result of a system, but was one of the 
unhappy and too common accidents of civil war. 
 
Lastly, after the rebellion in the Principalities had ended, and after “the fate of 
Ypsilanti and his adherents had been determined,” Ottoman troops “should be 
withdrawn—the hospodars re-established—and everything placed on a footing 
conformable to treaties.”46  By the time of these assertions of compliance with 
the Russian terms, however, Stroganov had already ordered the departure of 
the Russian embassy staff from the Ottoman capital. 
 Along with Russian-Ottoman antagonism, Strangford’s communiqués 
dealt with other facets of the Eastern crisis of 1821, including cases of the 
Porte’s forbearance and moderation.  Indeed, the British envoy successfully 
interceded on behalf of the inhabitants of Milos, after they had requested “my 
good offices at the Porte to obtain for them some degree of protection against 
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the oppressions of the Turkish ships of war cruizing in the Archipelago.”  Be-
cause this island “is the place from which His Majesty’s ships, as well as the 
British merchant vessels, are constantly supplied with pilots for the navigation 
of the Archipelago, I thought it had a fair claim to my protection.”  At Strang-
ford’s urging, the kapudan pasha (grand admiral and commander of the Otto-
man navy) instructed the Turkish admiral commanding those waters “to secure 
the Milotes against the rapacity of the Turkish cruizers.”47  Ottoman authorities 
also agreed to curtail “the fanatic and ungovernable conduct of the Turks” in 
Smyrna, where “apprehensions of a general massacre of the Christian inhabi-
tants” caused distress and disquiet.  The sultan acceded to Strangford’s request 
for an Ottoman decree, “addressed to the people of Smyrna, commanding, in 
the most positive terms, the restoration of tranquillity and good order, and the 
cessation of all further violence and persecution whether against the Franks or 
the Greeks.”48 
 Yet Strangford routinely made reference to the all too many cases of 
retribution and excess, incidences of random and deliberate violence, often, 
but not always, driven by religious wrath.  This cycle of retaliation and reprisal 
not only intensified the Eastern emergency but magnified the human cost of 
the burgeoning conflict.  For instance, Strangford’s message of 26 June 1821 
informed Castlereagh that “twelve Greeks of distinction, and among them Mr. 
Argiropulo (formerly dragoman of the Porte), were seized, and after a short 
confinement, sent into exile in Asia Minor.”  A frightful tragedy also occurred:  
“Five Greek bishops (those of Derkon, Salonica, Adrianople, Turnovo, and 
Silivria) and three prelates of an inferior rank, together with several laymen, 
were publickly hanged at Constantinople.”49 
 Strangford’s subsequent missives described additional abuses. 
 
I learn from Enos that in the Gulf of Saros, the Turks had taken four of the 
Greek vessels, the crews of which were instantly hanged.  Some dreadful scenes 
have taken place at the town of the Dardanelles.  The Turkish squadron, on per-
ceiving a large force of the insurgents cruizing off the entrance of the Straits, had 
returned to the Dardanelles, and to indemnify themselves for this mortification, 
the crews had landed and had committed the most violent outrages on the peace-
able Greek inhabitants of the town, many of whom had been shot, and their 
houses plundered and burned.  Previously to this transaction, a body of Greeks 
had landed on the Troad, and had carried off a quantity of cattle for the use of 
their fleet.50 
 
Strangford also recounted killings committed by the Greeks, such as the fate of 
the Turkish garrison at Navarino. 
 
The intelligence from the Morea is of a very mixed description with respect to 
the events of the war in that quarter.  The fortress of Navarino (a strong place 
near Modon [Methoni]) had surrendered to the Greeks, who violated the capitu-
lation by inhumanly butchering the garrison (which had been transported to 
Samos), notwithstanding the exertions and remonstrances of M. Bornfort, the 
French consul at that island.51 
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 With the spread of revolution to the Morea and the Aegean, and with 
the growing fear of hostilities between Russia and Turkey, residents of the Ot-
toman capital fretfully witnessed outbursts of rage.  Strangford’s letter of 10 
July 1821 reported that “[t]he conclusion of the Bairam was marked by the 
most disgraceful and sanguinary excesses, principally committed in Pera, the 
place where the Franks, in general, reside.”  These abuses prompted the Porte 
to issue a series of firmans, “published at the mosques and other places of pub-
lic resort.”  One such decree prohibited all Muslims from attacking reaya and 
declared “that any Turk who should maltreat them without provocation should 
be punished with death.”  Another Ottoman order, “not less beneficial, has 
been that of disarming the Turkish children.  Little miscreants, under seven 
years of age, and armed with daggers and pistols, had, till now, the privilege of 
robbing, stabbing, and shooting with impunity.”  This havoc, “which had con-
tinued but too long,” ended as a result of the government’s actions; “the shops 
and markets are again opened,” and “Constantinople enjoys, at present, a 
greater degree of tranquillity and security than has been known there during 
many weeks.”52 
 Images of another type of excess, the execution of prisoners in Con-
stantinople, found expression in Strangford’s correspondence of 1821.  On 9 
October, 
 
Some Greeks, mostly soldiers and sailors, were executed. . . . Among them was a 
priest, of respectable character and connexions; in whose house letters are said 
to have been found, which he was upon the point of despatching to some of his 
friends in the islands, cautioning them not to put any trust in the amnesty lately 
proclaimed by the Porte, but to continue their efforts in the cause of liberty.53 
 
 On 7 November 1821, “twenty of the leaders of the insurrection in 
Moldavia, lately taken prisoners in that province, arrived at Constantinople,” 
and two days later “[t]he greater number of these unhappy wretches were exe-
cuted.”  Strangford registered his surprise and unease to the reis efendi, won-
dering why the Porte “had acted with such extraordinary severity towards the 
unfortunate men who were executed,” but had spared the lives of forty-seven 
persons captured some time ago from the island of Samothrace.  The reis 
efendi clarified the essential difference between the two episodes.  The exe-
cuted rebel leaders 
 
deserved a thousand deaths—[and] they had been selected for punishment on ac-
count of the infamy of their character, and of the atrocious cruelties which they 
had exercised against some Turks who had fallen into their hands not many 
weeks ago. 
 
Meanwhile, the Samothracians “had never broken out into open rebellion, nor 
committed any act of insubordination except refusing to pay the capitation tax.”  
In fact, as Strangford learned from his embassy’s first dragoman, “the true rea-
son” for the death sentence against the imprisoned mutineers from Moldavia 
“was the fury and indignation excited at the Porte by the capture of Tripolitsa, 
and by the barbarous conduct of the Greeks at that place and at Navarino.”54  
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Strangford gathered evidence of these Greek atrocities, including a “deposition 
on oath, made at the British chancery by a most respectable gentleman, who 
was an eyewitness to the horrors committed by those calling themselves Chris-
tians, at Navarino and Tripolitsa.”  The details of this bloodshed, while they 
could not justify the anger of the Turks in the capital, “amply account for it.  
The popular fury is now very strong; and it was with a view to content it that 
fifteen or sixteen miserable prisoners were, last week, taken out of the Bagno 
[prison], and publicly executed.”55 
 Strangford continued to evoke the perceived collapse of public order 
in Constantinople, writing on 26 November 1821 that “[r]obberies and mur-
ders have been frequent, and several individuals belonging to, or under the 
protection of foreign [envoys] have been insulted, or threatened in the streets.”  
This harassment, “originating mainly in the exasperation occasioned by the 
cruelties of the Greeks in the Morea, . . . [and] excited by the numerous execu-
tions which have lately taken place at Constantinople, threatened daily to grow 
worse.”56  When Strangford implored the Porte on this issue, he got a promise 
that measures would be taken to restore calm in the capital. 
 In addition to the volatile situation in Constantinople, Strangford por-
trayed the turmoil and turbulence afflicting Smyrna, the most prominent 
commercial hub in the Ottoman Levant and the scene of urban disarray and 
sectarian cruelty after the outbreak of the Greek revolt.  Based largely on regu-
lar intelligence from Britain’s consul, Francis Werry, Strangford depicted an 
unstable maritime center fast becoming a danger zone for Greek Christian 
residents and European trade interests.  The ambassador’s detailed memoran-
dum of late June 1821, chronicling nearly a month of mayhem, began by as-
serting that on 3 June, 
 
a general massacre of the Greek population was intended, and only prevented by 
the determined conduct of the local authorities, who were anxious to fulfill the 
sultan’s orders by protecting the innocent inhabitants from the fury of the Turks.  
On that night, fifteen Greeks were killed in the town, and twenty in the neigh-
bourhood.57 
 
By the next day, “all the shops were closed,” and several days later, 
 
the Greeks’ bishop was arrested.  Immediately a great alarm was excited; and 
when the magazines and houses of some fugitives were sealed up, the confusion 
was considerably increased among the Greeks, who were hurrying on board the 
ships in the harbour, dreading a general massacre. 
 
Yet nothing “very serious occurred—the pasha’s authority was established in 
the city—some of the Greeks returned to their houses on shore—the shops 
were opened and confidence seemed to revive.” 
 But when information circulated on 14 June that insurgents had de-
stroyed a Turkish warship, “it was soon evident that the Turks would not per-
mit this disgrace to pass unrevenged.”  By the next day, much of the seashore 
“was occupied by Turks armed with rifles, and firing at every Greek they met, 
and not less than 160 were murdered within and without the town.”  The 
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British consul, worried about the safety of his house and property, sought the 
assistance of the pasha “to check the progress of the mob,” only to discover 
that the pasha and several of his officers had to confront a storm of popular 
protest over a large Russian vessel set to leave port that very evening. 
 
The Turkish population wished to detain her, suspecting that her passengers 
were recruits, and her cargo ammunition and stores for the insurgents. . . . [T]he 
populace surrounded the houses of the chief Turkish officers, and after abusing 
them in the most insolent manner, compelled the mullah, the bash ayan [chief 
provincial notable], and the customhouse officer to meet for the purpose of again 
agitating the subject of the Russian vessel. 
 
Although the ship had already sailed, it “ran aground near the castle—upon 
which, boats were sent out to force her back.”  But before the ship’s return to 
port, violence broke out. 
 
[T]he mob, irritated by the suspicion that the permission to depart had been ob-
tained by bribery, and also excited by the janissaries, shot the mullah and the 
bash ayan, and some others.  In consequence of this act of rebellion on the part 
of the Turks, there was no longer any restraint on the fury of the people.  Men 
and women were indiscriminately murdered—and this dreadful scene only 
ceased when no more victims were to be found. 
 
 The French and British consuls instructed their nationals to find haven 
on French- and British-flagged ships in the harbor and petitioned the pasha 
“for some additional guards to ensure their personal safety.”  The janissaries 
 
swore in their [the consuls’] presence that they would act in conformity with the 
orders of the government, and only punish the guilty—but in return, demanded 
of them to send on shore all the Greeks who had sought refuge on board their 
ships. 
 
Werry did not consider this vow “sufficient to inspire much confidence” and 
requested Strangford, in view of “the peculiar and perilous state of affairs at 
Smyrna,” to intervene with the Ottoman government for the security of British 
nationals and their property.  Firmans, Werry insisted, 
 
will be of no avail.  The pasha has only a nominal authority, and the janissaries are 
not likely to obey him when the opportunity for plunder is so inviting.  The ap-
proaching feast of Bairam, after the Ramazan, is at all times a period of licence, 
and is now much to be dreaded.  The late catastrophe at Aivali will act as a violent 
inducement to similar atrocities. 
 
 Strangford elaborated on the massacre of Aivali’s Greek inhabitants in 
his message of 26 June 1821 to Castlereagh.58  “Some time ago,” the envoy 
acknowledged, “an insurrection broke out at Aivali, a large and flourishing city 
of Asia Minor, principally inhabited by Greeks, whose numbers are stated to 
amount to twenty thousand.”  The Ottoman governor Osman Pasha had orders 
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“to put the whole of this population to the sword,” but he “contented himself 
with the submission of the inhabitants, and deferred the execution of his or-
ders, untill he should receive fresh instructions from Constantinople, for 
which purpose he dispatched one of his principal officers.”  In the meantime, 
when Strangford mediated on behalf of Aivali’s residents, the reis efendi 
 
strongly denied the existence of the sanguinary orders said to have been trans-
mitted to Osman Pasha, declaring that such instructions would have been equally 
repugnant to the principles of humanity inculcated by the Koran, and to the per-
sonal feelings of the Ottoman government. 
 
 It was thus “with as much surprize as concern that I learned from the 
reis efendi on Saturday last that the whole of the male population of Aivali had 
been massacred, and that the women and children had been sent into slavery.”  
The Ottoman foreign minister 
 
justified this proceeding by stating that Osman Pasha, having accepted the sub-
mission of the Aivaliotes, carried his indulgence so far as to permit them to re-
tain their arms—that matters remained perfectly tranquil in the town, till the 
sudden appearance in the offing, of a large squadron of the Greek insurgents, in-
duced the inhabitants to hope that it had come to their succour, and that they 
might make another attempt at revolt with better success.  They accordingly rose 
en masse, and butchered about fifteen hundred Turks. 
 
When the squadron, whose appearance in the bay had been simply accidental, 
sailed away, “the Turks recovered their courage, and an indiscriminate massa-
cre of the Greeks was the just though dreadful reward of their perfidy.” 
 To prevent killings in Smyrna, and to allay fears among the port’s 
European residents and Greek Christians, Strangford earnestly appealed to the 
Porte both before and after the Aivali massacre.  Ottoman officials agreed to 
restore order and to halt all further violence and persecution against the 
Franks and the Greeks.59  As of early July 1821, the situation stabilized: “[T]he 
measures which I had prevailed upon this government to take for the re-
establishment of public tranquillity at Smyrna” had succeeded.  The authority 
of the pasha had returned, and 
 
the Bairam had passed over without any alarming occurrence.  But this consoling 
intelligence is compensated by the melancholy information of the plague having 
broken out at Smyrna.  It appears to have been (as usual) introduced there by a 
vessel from Alexandria.60 
 
 Smyrna seesawed between stability and strife, as we learn from subse-
quent letters.  “The Frank population,” Strangford wrote on 26 July 1821, 
“continued in perfect safety, but public executions and private assassinations 
were but too common among the Greeks.”61  Yet a few weeks later (18 
August), in contrast to the news of carnage in the Morea and the Aegean, 
“[f]rom Smyrna the accounts [by Francis Werry] are much more consoling.”  
Trade revived, confidence resurfaced, and “perfect tranquillity” reigned.  “All 
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the foreign ships of war had withdrawn from Smyrna—a satisfactory proof of 
the security which prevailed there.”62  By autumn, however, fright and trepida-
tion again pervaded the streets.  “A Greek had been assassinated by a Candiote 
Turk on the morning of the 17th [of October].  The palace guard of the pasha, 
being sent in pursuit of the offender, executed justice upon him in a very 
summary manner.”  In retaliation, the Candiote Turks of Smyrna, joined by 
two regiments of janissaries, “immediately assembled before the palace, and 
proceeded to attack it.  The conflict lasted some hours, with the loss of many 
lives on both sides.”63  The unruliness of these Candiote Turks only increased, 
according to Strangford’s communiqué of 10 November. 
 
The conduct of the Candiote Turks at Smyrna, and the atrocities which they 
committed against the unfortunate Greeks, became at last so intolerable that the 
pasha was compelled to do what he ought to have done long ago, and to expel 
these infamous miscreants from the city.  They were seized and sent to Candia . . . 
on board of some French vessels hired by the pasha for the purpose.  Tranquillity 
was immediately restored.64
 But exactly one month later (10 December), Strangford vividly re-
counted the “serious disturbances” that flared up again in Smyrna.  “Confi-
dence had begun to gain ground, and trade had revived, when suddenly, on 
the morning of that day [20 November], a general alarm was spread that it was 
the intention of the Turks to massacre the entire Greek population.”  No one 
knew for sure how or when this unsettling rumor originated, but “it was most 
probably spread by a number of Turks from the adjacent country, who had 
been observed, for the two or three preceding days, to flock into Smyrna, and 
to wander through the streets with arms in their hands.”  They evidently sought 
to provoke disorder, availing themselves “of the confusion for the purpose of 
plundering the inhabitants.”  These agitators, 
 
emboldened by the consternation excited by the report which they had circulated, 
proceeded to murder three or four Greeks—and the signal, thus given, was 
promptly followed by the massacre of nearly sixty unfortunate persons belonging 
to that nation. 
 
Although Werry notified Strangford that the number of victims “has been rep-
resented as four or five hundred,” the ambassador could “depend upon the 
accuracy of the statement which fixes the killed and wounded at sixty.” 
 Upon hearing of these and other excesses in Smyrna, Britain’s envoy 
submitted a strong note to the reis efendi, protesting “the disgraceful state in 
which the second city of the Empire was placed by the weakness or timidity of 
its local government” and demanding renewed measures for restoring public 
order.  The Ottoman foreign minister countered with the complaint that the 
Porte 
 
was justly offended with the foreign consuls at Smyrna, who had made large sums 
of money by aiding the escape of the Grand Seignior’s [sultan’s] Greek subjects, 
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and whose audacity in so doing had justly excited the indignation of the Turks, 
and had been a principal cause of the late disturbances. 
 
The Ottoman government indeed took steps to re-establish stability, including 
the dismissal of the Smyrna pasha’s Albanian guards, who had been employed 
“from a motive of avarice—they served without pay, and lived by plunder.  
Their removal has produced the best effects,” with Smyrna now “more peace-
able” than at any time since the start of the insurgency.65 
 As the Greek uprising overwhelmed more regions, an expanding arc of 
crisis loomed in the Levant.  In Salonica, based on Strangford’s summaries of 
the intelligence he garnered from the office of Britain’s consul (Francis 
Charnaud) in that commercial center, “great alarm continued to prevail” by 
late July 1821.  “A general revolt against the Turks had taken place throughout 
all Thessaly—not one of the Turkish villages had been spared.”  Although 
“[n]o Greeks had been massacred at Salonica, [t]he clergy, and most of the 
lower classes of the people, had been placed in confinement.”  British mer-
chants of the Levant Company, perceiving themselves “in imminent danger,” 
requested the protection of a ship of war, an appeal “renewed to me con-
tinually from every place in the Levant where British interests are at stake.”66  
By late August, security in Macedonia had deteriorated, as 
 
a large body of Asiatic Turks under the command of Bairam Pasha, in its passage 
to the Morea, had committed dreadful devastations throughout the country.  This 
conduct, it is feared, may exasperate the Greeks to such a degree as to induce the 
provinces, that have hitherto taken no part in the present rebellion, to revolt and 
join the insurgents.67 
 
 A tenuous calm, however, appeared to hold by early October 1821.  
“The newly nominated Greek bishops had arrived at Salonica, escorted by of-
ficers of the Porte, and provided with firmans,” producing the effect of “con-
soling and tranquillizing the Greeks.  The shopkeepers and tradesmen belong-
ing to that nation, who were previously placed in confinement as hostages, had 
been released, and perfect confidence was restored.”  Yet the duration of this 
renewed order largely depended on the fate of nearby Cassandra, the site of 
Greek-Ottoman fighting.68  By year’s end, “all was tranquil” at Salonica.  Those 
Greeks who “had consented to lay down their arms were received with kind-
ness and even with hospitality by the Turkish authorities.”  But the Turks 
 
had marched against Sikia, the opposite headland to Cassandra.  I learn that the 
slaughter at the capture of the last mentioned place was dreadful.  The Greeks 
had obstinately refused to surrender on any terms.  But previously to the assault, 
thirty-one families of the besieged had claimed the protection of the amnesty, 
and had been safely conducted to Salonica.69 
 
 From Crete, as of late July 1821, the Greeks had rebelled at Chania 
and “dreadful scenes have occurred at that place.  A fetwa [religious ruling] 
was issued on the 30th [of June] to destroy all the reaya; and on the same day, 
twenty-five were put to death.”  Several days later, “the Sphakiotes came down 
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from the mountains to avenge the slaughter of their brethren,” and in the ensu-
ing skirmish with Ottoman troops, “the Turks lost a standard, a principal offi-
cer, and a considerable number of men.”70  By mid-August, the commotion 
had spread to other parts of Crete, with “many Greeks having been slaugh-
tered.  A considerable body of them had, however, placed themselves in a 
strong and defensible post, and had prepared for a vigorous resistance.”71  By 
year’s end, aggravating the trouble on Crete, “the Candiotes, who had been 
expelled from Smyrna and sent back to their own country, had begun to exer-
cise the same system of violence and robbery which had at last forced the pa-
sha of Smyrna to drive them away.”72 
 The insurgency engulfed Cyprus by early August 1821, but the island’s 
Ottoman governor, “having received secret intelligence of the plot, has suc-
ceeded in frustrating it.  Eight Greeks were decapitated upon this occasion.”73 
About a week later, Strangford again referred to Cyprus: “I apprehend that the 
discovery of the plot formed by the Greeks at Cyprus has led to most sangui-
nary excesses on the part of the government of that island.”74  Strife persisted 
into September, based on accounts “of the most distressing nature” that Strang-
ford obtained from Cyprus.  “The severities exercised by the barbarous müte-
sellim [deputy governor] of that unfortunate island, against its Greek popula-
tion, and his misbehaviour towards the foreign consuls,” compelled the British 
envoy to deliver a strong note of protest to the Porte, requesting that official’s 
“immediate removal” from his post.75 
 Lastly, controversy invariably stirred on the British-protected Ionian 
Islands.  Already in mid-June 1821, the reis efendi alerted Strangford of Otto-
man distress over Ionian Greek volunteers, supplies, and ships that contributed 
to the insurrection.  The Porte demanded 
 
that the vessels of the insurgents should not be allowed to arm, refresh, or re-
cruit, within the ports of the Ionian States; that they should not be permitted to 
carry their prizes into those ports; that the insurgent flag should not be recog-
nized in the Ionian Sea; [and] that the rebels should not receive an asylum within 
the Ionian territories. 
 
Strangford confirmed British compliance with the first three imperatives, add-
ing that “the Ionian cruizers would have orders to protect and assist the Turk-
ish navigation in those seas.”  As for the final stipulation, 
 
while every effort would be made by the Ionian government to discourage the 
admission of fugitive rebels into its dependencies, it was not to be expected that 
they would be given up, should they continue to elude our vigilance, and to effect 
their escape into our territory. 
 
The Porte thus had to “remain content with the assurance that the Ionian 
authorities would do all they could to prevent the case from occurring, but 
that if ever it did, their complaisance could not be carried any further.”76 
 Britain’s Ionian connection continued to encumber British-Ottoman 
cooperation, and the Porte vented dissatisfaction with the so-called neutrality 
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of the British protectorate.  Already by mid-August 1821, according to the reis 
efendi’s objection to Strangford, 
 
three thousand Ionians are fighting against the Turks in the Morea, [and] the 
Septinsular government takes no steps to recall them—because it is afraid of do-
ing anything that may be contrary to the general feelings of the islanders, which 
are decidedly favourable to the insurgents. 
 
Additionally, armed Ionian vessels attacked or threatened Ottoman shipping; 
and many Ionians, after joining the rebels, returned to their own country 
without facing inquiry into their conduct, benefiting from “the protection said 
to be given to the property and families of the insurgents.”  All these discon-
certing developments “have produced a degree of irritation and suspicion on 
the part of the Ottoman government, seriously menacing that credit and confi-
dence which it is, at this moment, of such incalculable importance for us to 
maintain unimpaired.”77 
 Lord Strangford’s narratives from Constantinople reflect some of the 
flaws and limitations of primary sources written by Europeans in the Ottoman 
world.  His observations echoed conventional Western perceptions of the Ot-
toman Empire and stigmatized the Ottoman other with distortion and exag-
geration.  Envoys and consuls—and not just British representatives—depicted 
Ottoman officialdom in a mostly negative light, accenting episodes of oppres-
sion, extortion, and related abuses of power by pashas, janissaries, and cus-
toms officers.  Many of these authorities, portrayed as rapacious, corrupt, and 
arbitrary, interfered in the administration of European diplomatic and com-
mercial concessions—the capitulations—and thus complicated European-
Ottoman affairs.  Through their anecdotes, remarks, and choice of words, 
Western records alluded to commonly accepted European images of the Ot-
toman Empire, fast becoming “the sick man of Europe” in Western political 
discourse and popular opinion.78 
 Yet Strangford’s dispatches clarify some of the salient but neglected 
aspects of the Eastern Question, such as commerce, piracy, and janissary un-
rest.  He relied on a circle of sources, gleaning intelligence from merchants, 
travelers, protégés, consuls, and dragomans; from local and regional Ottoman 
authorities, including pashas and customs officers and their interpreters; and 
from other European envoys.  Sifting through these different accounts, while 
carrying out the British objective of retaining cordial ties with the Porte, 
Strangford amended his sweeping condemnation of the Ottoman government.  
He diligently chronicled what he deemed the most critical realities in Constan-
tinople and covered a range of topics beyond the purely political and diplo-
matic facets of the Eastern crisis.  The very specificity and urgency of his re-
ports sharpen our focus on the multiple issues, such as sectarian violence, that 
marked an age of upheaval in the Ottoman Levant.  Lastly, his writings exem-
plify the value of primary source materials for investigating the most pivotal 
events at the core of the Eastern Question, including the precarious status of 
Eastern Orthodoxy. 
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